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Performance-based financing (PBF) is being widely implemented to improve healthcare services in Af-
rica. An essential component of PBF involves conducting community verifications, wherein investigators
from local associations attempt to trace samples of patients. Community surveys are administered to
patients to verify whether healthcare workers reported fictitious services to increase their revenue. At
the same time, client satisfaction surveys are administered to assess whether patients are satisfied with
the services received. Although some global health actors are concerned that PBF can trigger unintended
consequences, this topic remains neglected. The objective of this study was to document the unintended
consequences of community verification. Guided by the diffusion of innovations theory, we conducted a
multiple case study. The cases were the catchment areas of seven healthcare facilities in Burkina Faso.
Data were collected between January 2016 and May 2016 using non-participant observation, 92 semi-
structured interviews, and informal discussions. Participants included a wide range of stakeholders,
such as community verifiers, investigators, patients, and healthcare providers. Data were coded using
QDA Miner, and thematic analysis was conducted. Healthcare workers did not significantly disturb or try
to influence community verifiers during patient selection for community verifications. Unintended
consequences included stakeholders’ dissatisfaction regarding compensation modalities, work overload
for community verifiers, and falsification of verification data by investigators. Community verifications
led to loss of patient confidentiality as well as fears and apprehensions, although some patients were
pleased to share their views regarding healthcare services. Community verifications also triggered
marital issues, resulting in conflicts with, or interference from, husbands. The numerous challenges
associated with locating patients in their communities led stakeholders to question the validity and
utility of the results. These unintended consequences could jeopardize the overall effectiveness of
community verifications. Attention should be paid to these unintended consequences to inform effective
implementation and refine future interventions.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Performance-based financing (PBF) is being widely imple-
mented to improve healthcare services in low- and middle-incomelic Health Research Institute,
1X9, Canada.
montreal.ca (A.-M. Turcotte-
Ltd. This is an open access article ucountries (LMICs). This approach represents a shift from input-
based financing to output-based financing. In PBF, contracted
healthcare facilities are paid according to the quantity and quality
of services they provide, to motivate them to perform better. To
promote accountability and transparency, the services delivered
are verified by independent structures before payments are
released. While verification is essential for any accountable system,
it is a cornerstone of PBF interventions, as it helps ensure that
services submitted for payment are actually provided and are ofnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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verification mechanisms already in place or set up new ones where
they are missing.
Verification mechanisms tend to be structured similarly across
PBF models, especially when supported by the same organization
(e.g., World Bank). In Burkina Faso, for example, services provided
by healthcare facilities contracted under PBF are verified at two
levels: within facilities and within communities. For verifications
within facilities, a medical verifier from a contractualization and
verification agency (CVA) counts the quantity of services reported
in registers. Then, an evaluation team evaluates the quality of ser-
vices by inspecting the conditions of healthcare facilities and the
content of registers. However, these two types of verifications are
insufficient, because healthcare workers could falsify reports to
increase their performance scores or could treat patients poorly
evenwhen technical quality scores are high (Gorter et al., 2013; ST-
FBR, 2016).
To address the shortcomings of verifications within facilities,
two types of verifications are conducted at the community level,
which we refer to as community verifications. For these activities,
a community verifier extracts identification and medical infor-
mation from the consultation registers for a sample of patients
who visited the facility in the previous trimester. That information
is transmitted to investigators from a local association, who are
charged with tracing the sample of patients to administer two
surveys at the same time. First, community surveys are adminis-
tered to assess the accuracy of the data provided by healthcare
workers by comparing patients' declarations against the health
facilities' data (Ministere de la Sante, 2016). This serves to deter
healthcare workers from reporting false services as well as to
detect fictitious patients or services reported, thereby increasing
accountability and transparency, as well as the quality of routine
information. Second, client satisfaction surveys are administered to
determine patients' level of satisfactionwith the services provided
by the health facilities and to collect patients' suggestions for
improving quality of care (Ministere de la Sante, 2016). The in-
formation collected through the satisfaction survey contributes to
the calculation of the healthcare facility's overall quality score and
thereby influences bonus payments that motivate providers. In
Burkina Faso, the client satisfaction survey was also presented as a
way to reinforce the voice of the community (ST-FBR, 2016).
Similarly, some global health actors have argued it can empower
communities, leading to a more equal and constructive relation-
ship with providers (Renmans et al., 2017). Other global health
actors, however, believe the verification process can create distrust
and endanger the relationship between the community and pro-
viders (Renmans et al., 2017). Such divergence suggests that, to
date, there is a lack of consensus regarding the theory of change
and mechanisms at play.
Despite the growing interest around PBF in LMICs, little research
has specifically focused on verifications in general or teased apart
its multiple mechanisms (Falisse et al., 2012; Renaud and
Semasaka, 2014; Renmans et al., 2016; Witter et al., 2013). To our
knowledge, the community survey and the client satisfaction sur-
vey are neglected research topics, as little empirical data is available
and certain useful data collection methods, such as non-participant
observation, have not sufficiently been used. This is a significant
gap in the literature, considering the importance of community
verifications to ensure proper functioning of PBF in LMICs and to
increase accountability of systems. One of the rare studies on this
topic analyzed 79 community-based organizations (CBOs) con-
tracted to verify health facilities’ performance in Burundi (Falisse
et al., 2012). The authors concluded that PBF does not necessarily
give greater voice to communities and that more experiments are
needed to develop efficient mechanisms of accountability inhealthcare facilities. More recently, an action research in Benin
showed that providers received limited feedback, despite the high
costs and time invested in verifications (Antony et al., 2017).
Alongside these considerations, some global health actors are
concerned that the different components of PBF can cause unin-
tended consequences beyond the targeted objectives of the inter-
vention (Fretheim et al., 2012). Unintended consequences are
defined as changes that occur in a social system for which there is a
lack of deliberate action following adoption of an innovation such
as PBF (Ash et al., 2007a; Merton,1936; Rogers, 2003). They can also
be desirable or undesirable, as well as anticipated or unanticipated,
depending on stakeholders' views. For example, disclosure of pa-
tient information during community verification could have con-
sequences for patient confidentiality. To date, little research has
examined the unintended consequences emerging from PBF or its
verification mechanisms (Witter et al., 2013). This is an important
gap in the literature because unintended consequences could have
wide scope and breadth, equal to or surpassing intended conse-
quences. Consequently, an evidence-based understanding of
intended and unintended consequences could help stakeholders
judge an intervention's overall value.
This paper is intended to fill two knowledge gaps simulta-
neously by using the innovative analytical lens of unintended
consequences to study a neglected topic, community verifications
of PBF. More specifically, we document the unintended conse-
quences of a community verification process that coupled a com-
munity survey with a community client satisfaction survey in
Burkina Faso.2. Methods
2.1. Theoretical model
We used Rogers' diffusion of innovations theory to study un-
intended consequences (Rogers, 2003). Innovations, such as
community verifications and PBF in Burkina Faso, are ideas or
practices that are perceived as new by members of a social system.
Innovations are not fixed entities; rather, people shape them by
giving them meaning. The theory posits four main dimensions
that can influence the diffusion process of innovations, including
the emergence of unintended consequences. These are: 1) the
characteristics of the members of the social system (e.g. actors'
perceptions and interests); 2) the nature of the social system (e.g.
norms, culture, organizational capacity); 3) the nature of the in-
novations (e.g. compatibility, complexity, observability, relative
advantage); and 4) the use of the innovations (e.g. reinvention).
These dimensions interact to influence the emergence of conse-
quences, although what these will be is uncertain. According to
Rogers (2003), change agents are rarely able to predict the con-
sequences of an innovation nor people's subjective perceptions of
it. They often fail to consider cultural values, resulting in program
failure or at least unforeseen consequences. Rogers established
three categories for classifying consequences of innovations: 1)
desirable vs. undesirable, 2) anticipated vs. unanticipated, and 2)
direct vs. indirect. In operationalizing these concepts, we consid-
ered consequences to be anticipated if they were addressed in the
implementation guides. We integrated Ash's (Ash et al., 2007b)
approach, by considering direct consequences to be related to
processes and indirect consequences to outcomes. We also inte-
grated Bloomrosen et al.’s work (2011), which refined Rogers'
categorization of consequences to specify that intended conse-
quences tend to be simultaneously desirable and anticipated,
while unintended consequences tend to be undesirable and/or
unanticipated. Fig. 1 illustrates our theoretical framework.
Fig. 1. Theoretical framework.
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The study was conducted in a rural district of Burkina Faso.
According to the Human Development Index, Burkina Faso ranks
183rd of 188 countries (United Nations Development Programme,
2015). There are 371 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and
89 deaths of children under age five per 1000 births (World Bank,
2017).
In 2011, the government of Burkina Faso, supported by the
World Bank, conducted a pre-pilot PBF test in three districts to
improve maternal and child healthcare services. In 2014, this
intervention was modified and expanded to an additional 12 dis-
tricts. The intervention covers 4.5 million people and involves over
576 healthcare facilities. The intervention model calls for commu-
nity verifications to be carried out every trimester (Ministere de la
sante, 2013). Although PBF started in January 2014, the first and
second community verifications were only conducted in June 2015
and May 2016. In both cases, the community verification coupled a
community survey with a client satisfaction survey to determine
whether the patients reported in the medical registers actually
existed, and if so, whether they had received the services declared
andwere satisfiedwith the services provided. Supplementary File 1
describes the actors involved in community verifications in Burkina
Faso.
2.3. Research strategy
We conducted a multiple case study with several embedded
levels of analyses (Yin, 2009). This research was nested within a
larger longitudinal process evaluation of the PBF intervention
(Ridde et al., 2014; Ridde et al., 2017).
2.4. Sampling of cases
The cases were seven healthcare facilities and their catchment
areas. Six were Centres de sante et de promotion sociale (CSPS -
centers for health and social promotion) and one was a Centre
medical avec antenne chirurgicale (CMA e medical center with
surgical satellite services, district hospital). For the overarching
process evaluation, case selection followed a multistage screeningprocedure using mixed methods (Yin, 2009). We applied a series of
criteria to select the healthcare facilities, including: 1) location (e.g.
within a district that represents the normal healthcare system
context, in a relatively safe zone); 2) facility type (i.e., CSPSs and
hospitals); 3) performance level (e.g. high and low initial perfor-
mance on key activity indicators); 4) intervention arms (i.e., inter-
vention modalities using different financial incentives); and 5)
perceptions of key local informants regarding the facilities’ per-
formances, the representativeness of cases, and opportunities for
insight.
2.5. Sampling for interviews
Participants included a wide range of stakeholders, such as
community verifiers, investigators in charge of tracing patients,
community leaders, service users, healthcare providers, and rep-
resentatives from the Comites de gestion (COGES e healthcare fa-
cility management committees). Participants were purposefully
selected based on their ability to provide relevant information and
their accessibility. Then, using the snowball approach, some key
informants referred us to other potential participants who could
shed light on the intervention. The diversification principle
inherent in these approaches resulted in a sample of participants
with a variety of intrinsic characteristics, such as different occu-
pations, socio-economic statuses, and genders (Patton, 2015).
2.6. Data collection method
Data were collected during two sequential qualitative phases,
with the first informing the methods used for the second.
For the first phase, the first author conducted about three
months of fieldwork between January and April 2016. Data were
collected on the first community verification conducted in June
2015 as well as on the PBF implementation. Field immersion pro-
vided a better understanding of context and helped establish trust
with stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews, informal discus-
sions, and non-participant observation were conducted in four fa-
cilities. Field notes on observations and informal discussions were
systematically recorded in research diaries. Observation sites
included healthcare facilities and social settings. The researcher
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for 2015, where community verifications across the country were
discussed.
For the second phase, the second author conducted 20 days of
fieldwork in May 2016, specifically to deepen our assessment of
community verifications. While verifications were taking place, the
researcher conducted semi-structured interviews, informal dis-
cussions, and non-participant observation in each of the seven
cases. Field notes were recorded in research diaries. Observation
sites included the seven healthcare facilities (during selection of
patients), villages (during investigations), and other social settings
(during meals and festivities). Due to limited resources, we gave
more weight to the four facilities visited in the first phase (primary
cases) than to the three cases added in the second phase (secondary
cases).
We conducted 92 semi-structured interviews: 76 during the
first phase and 16 during the second phase, which was primarily
devoted to non-participant observations. As well, 241 observation
sessions were recorded in research diaries. Local community
members not directly involved with the intervention served as
interpreters during 15 interviews. Applying the principle of satu-
ration, we stopped collecting data when interviews and observa-
tions no longer provided information that was sufficiently different
to justify continuing. Research team members transcribed re-
cordings of semi-structured interviews. Table 1 provides a break-
down of the data collected for each case and across cases.2.7. Instruments
We constructed semi-structured interview guides that drew
upon previous questionnaires used for innovation diffusion
research (Spicer, 1952; Warford, 2005) but were tailored to this
study's needs and adapted to the different types of stakeholders
(see Supplementary File 2). The guides assessed how factorsdsuch
as the social system, characteristics of the members, and the nature
and use of the innovationdinteracted to produce unintended
consequences of community verifications over time.2.8. Data analyses
The primary unit of analysis was each healthcare facility and its
catchment area. We conducted thematic analysis on the data. Data
were triangulated by comparing various information sources
(Olivier de Sardan and Tidjani Alou, 2015). Using a hybridTable 1
Summary of data collected to study unintended consequences of community v
Non-participant observation




Other support staff (drug manager, janitor, security guard)
Volunteers & trainees
Community leaders (e.g. COGES & community health workers, counselor)
Service users
District level
Administrative staff (e.g. manager, accountant)
CVA members
Members of local association conducting community verifications
National level
Representative from the Programme d'appui au developpement en sante (PA
Representative from the Service technique - financement base sur les resulta
Total interviewsdeductive-inductive approach, we assigned data to predefined
themes and derived new themes as we read through the data
(Pluye and Hong, 2014). We used QDA Miner 4 to code and retrieve
text segments.
We integrated the results from both data collection phases and
used a cross-case synthesis to draw general conclusions. Following
a replication logic, we considered that results independently
arising frommore than one case aremore powerful than those from
a single case, and thus the former were given more importance in
the results section (Yin, 2009).
2.9. Ethics
The protocol was approved by the research ethics committees in
Burkina Faso (deliberation N 2015-12-07) and at the University of
Montreal Hospital Research Center (CE 13.358). Participants pro-
vided consent to participate, as required by the ethics committees.
3. Results
Results showed that community verifications led to important
unintended consequences for implementers and service users. In
Table 2, these unintended consequences are classified according to
our conceptual model. The subsections below are labeled according
to the unintended consequences that arose as the intervention
process unfolded overtime. For each, we explain how the in-
teractions between the nature and use of the intervention, the
actors’ characteristics, and the nature of the social system led to the
emergence of these unintended consequences.
3.1. Work overload created by sampling of patients
The CVA's regular medical verifiers served as community veri-
fiers to select patients from registers. This task required significant
time and energy. For the sampling, community verifiers travelled
by motorcycle to healthcare facilities up to 90 km away in rural
areas, some of which had no paved roads. For the second com-
munity verification, two verifiers selected about 400 patients in
almost 20 healthcare facilities in under 10 days. Upon arrival, they
borrowed medical registers to select patients. The patient selection
procedure became more complex between the first and second
verifications. While the first used only random sampling, the sec-
ond used a mixed approach that incorporated purposeful sampling











DS - program to support health development) 1
ts (ST-FBR - results-based financing e technical service) 1
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Table 2
Classification of unintended consequences.
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patients (e.g. assisted birth, prenatal consultation). Some indicators
were omitted to protect confidentiality (e.g. family planning, HIV,
tuberculosis) and for reasons of practicality (e.g. household visits).
Community verifiers manually completed a first form for each
selected patient by transcribing their name, profession, sex, age,
address, telephone number, symptoms, and treatments prescribed.
Sample size depended on the number of patients who had visited
the facility during the previous trimester but represented approx-
imately 1% of consultations purchased through PBF during the
trimester.
“[The community verifier] took more than four hours to compile the
sample for this healthcare center.” (Field notes, case 5)
During evenings, community verifiers continued preparing the
community verification process. They filled out a second form that
was given to members of a local association, called investigators,
whose rolewas to trace patients and assess the services received. To
help protect patient confidentiality, this form contained no medical
information. After the community verifications, verifiers entered
the data and analyzed any discordance between both forms to
determine whether patients reported the same information that
healthcare workers reported.
The heavy workload involved in patient selection influenced the
launch of the community verification by the local association. The
morning the verification was supposed to start, the investigators
were informed that the “forms weren't entirely ready” and that it
would be postponed by almost a week. Ultimately, the local asso-
ciation received the samples in two batches, which disrupted the
association's schedule and organization.
“We really were under pressure, physical and psychological, to get
these samplings within the specified time frame.” (Community
verifier_28, interview, across cases).3.2. Little interference of healthcare workers during patient
selection
Healthcare workers did not significantly disturb or try to influ-
ence community verifiers during patient selection. One head nurse
did, however, openly express nervousness regarding the verifica-
tion process, for example, by hovering around the community
verifier during the selection of patients and stating that villagers
might speak badly of him despite his hard work. At the district
hospital, healthcare workers urged the community verifier to
release the registers as soon as possible, as the lack of registers was
slowing down their work.
3.3. Dissatisfaction and conflicts regarding funding and payment
modalities
The different actors across the cases were dissatisfied with the
funding and payment modalities.
3.3.1. Community verifiers
Community verifiers reported that the PADS, i.e., the organiza-
tion in charge of managing the funds at the national level, did not
transfer the money to support community verifications in 2016.
Thus, the CVA had to pre-finance the activities, which caused de-
lays, logistical complications, and motivational issues.
3.3.2. Local association
Representatives from the local association in charge of coordi-
nating the investigators decried the lack of financial support for the
association. To compensate, they withheld part of the sum paid to
investigators for each patient found.
3.3.3. Investigators
Investigators from all cases complained about the costebenefit
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energy, and money (including transportation and communication
fees) for each patient they were tracking down. In return, they
received up to $4.19 USD (2500 CFA francs) per patient found, but
the local association deducted overhead fees ($0.81e1.62 USD/pa-
tient; 500e1000 CFA francs/patient). If investigators found that a
patient had died or moved away permanently, they were paid.
However, if they were unable to find a patient who, for example,
was travelling temporarily or was simply absent during the verifi-
cation, they were not paid. Also, investigators were not paid when
patients reported different information than healthcare workers,
because these forms were not validated. This was especially prob-
lematic with respect to elderly patients who did not remember for
which disease they had sought care. This payment scheme was
chosen in an attempt to prevent investigators from inventing
verification data for patients. However, it caused tensions between
the CVA and local association members because it was perceived as
a lack of recognition for the work accomplished.
“If patients aren't found, their forms aren't validated. So, imagine if
I had gone to a healthcare center today, spent my entire day in that
area, and didn't find a single persondthat would mean my day
didn't count, even though it cost me money. That's my situation
currently … it's really irritating!” (Investigator_31, interview,
cases 1, 2 & 5)
3.3.4. Community health workers (CHWs)
Some CHWs who helped investigators trace patients in the
villages were disappointed by the lack of compensation. While
many did not explicitly ask investigators for money, the non-
compensation created uneasiness among the parties.3.4. Fears and apprehensions regarding community verifications
Patients and family members had mixed reactions to commu-
nity verification, regardless of the dominant ethnic group within
the catchment area. Across cases, many patients showed signs of
apprehension only in the beginning, while others stayed fearful of
investigators throughout the process. Investigators reassured
community members by stating that their visit was “cold”da local
expression implying that there was no problem. Some fearful
community members even hid information that could have helped
investigators find patients.
“When you said you were looking for [my name], that's when I got
scared and asked myself lots of questions: ‘Why are these people at
our home, asking not for my husband, but me?’ (…) I answered ‘yes’
in a low voice because I was afraid.” (Patient_35, interview, case 5)
Once reassured, some patients expressed gratitude regarding
the verification process, as it allowed them to share their views.
“It's true that it’s a surprise, but it also allowed me to share my
opinions.” (Patient_35, interview, case 5)
Part of this apprehensionwasdue to thenoveltyof the activityand
lackofawareness in thecommunities. Communityverifiersexplained
that, for the 2016 verification, they tried to collaborate more with
local actors such as prefects/mayors and radio stations (mainly in the
city) to better inform the population. However, one participant re-
ported that they did not “feel the effect of that in the field.”
“Many people don't have a radio at home (…) Because they didn't
get the information, that can have an influence, maybe make themreluctant (…). [Investigators] also don't have badges to say they're
really authorized to be there.” (Community verifier_28, interview,
across cases)
As the population was generally uninformed about PBF, we
examined whether, through community verifications, patients
learned that healthcare workers received financial incentives to
treat them and whether this influenced the patients’ levels of trust.
Results showed that investigators did not directly discuss PBF with
patients due to lack of time and fear of complications. Some in-
vestigators purposely avoided stating that the activity was a veri-
fication or survey, as they felt it would make it more difficult to
convince patients to collaborate.3.5. Fear of retaliation from healthcare workers
Some patients wereworried that healthcare workers would find
out what they reported and retaliate against them. Some partici-
pants at the local and national levels were concerned that patients’
fear influenced their responses.
“[the verification] is risky, because the healthcare workers, if
they're badly scored, might think that maybe those of us who talked
with you are to blame. Maybe they'll think we misinterpreted
things or maybe, regarding the quality of the healthcare center, we
were the ones who spoke badly about the place. Anyway, at the
CSPS, they'll have lots to say if they're badly rated.” (Patient_35,
interview, case 5)3.6. Loss of patient confidentiality
Investigators were trained to protect confidentiality when
tracing patients and were expected to complete the survey with
patients privately. In reality, however, the community verification
led to significant breaches of patient confidentiality across cases.
The majority of surveys were conducted in front of family mem-
bers, neighbors, and community health workers (see
Supplementary File 3). The latter sometimes acted as interpreters.
Investigators did not systematically ask to be alone with patients
before conducting the survey.While many patients did not seem to
mind the lack of confidentiality, others reported they were
intimidated and would have preferred to be alone during the
verification.
“The sound of our engines and the fact that we were clearly out-
siders aroused the curiosity of neighbors, who approached to see
what was happening. The questionnaire was administered to the
woman in front of them, and she replied without hesitation.” (Field
notes, case 5)
Women who had consulted for prenatal care or deliveries were
particularly embarrassed by the verification. In the local cultures,
pregnancy is generally not discussed openly with strangers.
"During this time, her brothers-in-law, who were plowing their
field just outside their concession, and her sisters-in-law all came
near, out of curiosity. Her parents-in-law and her children or
nephews were also sitting there listening attentively to her con-
versation with the investigator. But she seemed ashamed to
answer in front of everyone, because she had visited the healthcare
center in December to deliver a child. Throughout the interview,
she kept her head down and replied in subdued tones." (Field
notes, case 2)
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Given that PBF targets maternal healthcare, women constituted
a considerable portion of patients to be surveyed. All investigators
hired for the verification in 2016 were men. We found that some
husbands were concerned that strangers from the opposite sex (i.e.,
investigators) were contacting and meeting their wives without
their authorization. In local cultures, wives are sometimes consid-
ered to be under the responsibility and authority of their husbands.
As such, wives are not always free to be in contact with whomever
they want, especially a man they do not know. These gender dy-
namics led to various consequences: 1) some wives and in-
vestigators had altercations with husbandswho did not understand
why a man was contacting their wives without their consent; 2)
some husbands forbade their wives to answer surveys in their
absence; and 3) some husbands actively participated in the verifi-
cation, making suggestions and even influencing their wives’
responses.
“You know, last night, there were almost sparks flying here! (…)
[my husband] said that it was surely my lover who called me.”
(Patient cited in field notes, case 7)
“Her husband had an influence on her by sometimes whispering to
her, sometimes answering in her stead, especially making sugges-
tions.” (Field notes, case 2)
3.8. Falsification of community verification records
Multiple sources of evidence suggested that many actors con-
ducting the community verification developed deliberate and
organized strategies to falsify the surveys. Evidence suggested the
verification data was falsified in the majority of cases, but the
strategies used to do this differed according to the investigators in
charge of conducting the verification.
Two investigators impersonated PBF officers and used false
pretexts to access the registers in healthcare centers and retrieve
medical information that would enable them to falsify the patient
surveys. Healthcare workers reported that they had helped the
investigators go through the registers to find information on pa-
tients. Simply using the names and ages of patients, investigators
were able to find medical notes in the registers necessary to com-
plete survey questions, such as reason for seeking care and services
received.
“The investigator came to the CSPS and asked for the consultation
registers to search for some missing information on patients
selected for the community survey. We gave him the registers.”
(Healthcare worker cited in field notes, case 4)
One investigator who impersonated a PBF officer officially re-
ported that he found all 24 patients (100%) in a single day with the
help of CHWs. Yet the CHWs living in the area said they were never
contacted. Such reported numbers are high, considering that the
target recommended by intervention guidelines is about seven
patients per day per investigator.
In another case, an investigator who had an unsuccessful day
searching for patients filled out survey forms on his own, without
any patients nearby. His recurrent falsification of surveys was
confirmedwhen a patient whomhewas supposed to have traced in
another catchment area reported to us that she was never in con-
tact with this investigator, despite the fact that the local association
reported that 100% of selected patients had been traced in her
village. The falsification of forms partly explains why, at the districtlevel, 40% of verification forms reported information that was
inconsistent with medical registers during the first verification.
This percentage was higher than at the national level, where 28% of
forms were inconsistent with medical registers, according to data
presented at a national PBF meeting.
“The investigator sat on a chair under a mango tree (…) He opened
his bag and took out the survey forms. Then, with his pen, he filled
out two forms, one after the other.” (Field notes, case 4).
Another indication that verification data was falsified was that
the remarkable success rate (near 100%) reported in the local as-
sociation's final report was inconsistent with data from non-
participant observations and interviews (see Supplementary File
4). Observations showed that a large portion of patients were in
fact never traced or were absent when investigators passed by. The
investigators' statements during interviews, namely regarding the
unrealistic working conditions to attain objectives, also clashed
with the near-perfect performance reported in the local associa-
tion's final report.
“Per day, we're supposed to contact at least ten people (…) Some
days you go all around but can only find one person, and so you've
lost both petrol and energy.” (Investigator_46, interview, across
cases)
“Ten days really aren't enough because there are people who aren't
at home when we come by.” (Investigator_39, interview, case 7)
“Lots of difficulties! Because, in the time allotted, I couldn't even
finish what they asked of me (…) it's impossible to locate more
than 80 people in nine days.” (Investigator_31, interview, cases 1,
2 & 5)
Participants also described at great length how social system
characteristics hindered the community verification process. There
was a lack of compatibility between the community verification
process and the social system. Table 3 presents the characteristics
of the social system and its members that made it difficult to trace
patients. Although these obstacles are related to the implementa-
tion process, they help explain the context in which investigators
falsified data to achieve high performance scores and get paid for
each patient found.
Local actors who intervene across cases (e.g. community veri-
fiers and CVA coordinators, local association coordinator) agreed
there were high risks of data falsification and collusion between
stakeholders (e.g. healthcare workers and investigators). For
example, one community verifier confirmed that he saw surveys for
which the data appeared to have been falsified: “a five-year-old had
given birth.” Community verifiers and the CVA coordinator also
expressed concerns regarding the falsification of verification re-
cords, especially given the difficulty of observing the community
verification in action.
Different types of actors involved in community verifications
had incentives to report high performance scores. On one hand, the
local association obtained the contract through a competitive
process, in a context where it had few other ongoing projects or
funding opportunities. On the other, investigators were paid solely
according to the number of patients found and therefore had a
financial incentive to falsify reports, especially in a context where
financial difficulties and corruption are common. Healthcare
workers were also financially motivated to help investigators in
order to increase their bonuses.
“Currently, all the investigators are unemployed.” (Investigator_31,
interview, cases 1, 2 & 5)
Table 3
Characteristics of the social system and its members that made it difficult to find patients and obtain valid data.
Characteristics Examples of citations
Challenges of tracing patients
Lack of contact information “Of the 32 patients to be found, only three had cell phone numbers.” (Field notes, case 4)
Names of parents missing for child
consultations
“You can't write the name of a 6-month or 12-month-old child without his parents' names, and then ask me to find this child. It will be
nearly impossible when it's in a village. When a child is born today, everyone gives him his name (…) Sure, it's a survey, but the point
isn't to make investigators suffer.” (Investigator_31, interview, cases 1, 2 & 5)
Dysfunctional telephone networks in
rural areas
“The investigator tried to reach two patients successively but their numbers didn't work.” (Field notes, case 5)
Widespread use of nicknames (locally
referred to as botanical names)
instead of official names
“If a mother and father fought on the day of the child's birth, they might decide to call the baby ‘Big Mouth’.” (Birth attendant cited in
field notes, case 1).
Lack of knowledge regarding one's own
name or a family member's name
“A son didn't know his mother's name. The head nurse laughed a little at the patient. The volunteer explained that they use nicknames
in the village. They don't even try to know their names. Then, the community health worker arrived with a womanwho didn't know her
own name. She didn't give the same name as in her health booklet.” (Field notes, case 1)
Spelling mistakes of names in registers “Healthcare workers often write names down phonetically.” (Field notes, case 2)
“Do names like these exist in our community?!” (CHW cited in field notes, case 5)
Frequent homonyms within villages “In the village we'll find more than 20 people with the same name.” (Coordinator of local association_38, interview)
Names change over time “Someone born in the village, who has a botanical name, and who is then baptizeddhe goes to the healthcare center, gives his baptism
name, and when you go to the village, you'll search for him in vain. You won't find him.” (Investigator_31, interview, cases 1, 2 & 5)
Mobility of patients “… the period isn't really good for this (…) they're actually farmers, so there I had lots of problems due to patients moving around in
agricultural hamlets. That really messed things up.” (Investigator #30, interview, cases 3 & 7)
“People are migrating.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
“Mine workers are difficult to locate.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
Rainy season “I started out with rain so I wasn't able to get the number of patients I wanted that day.” (Investigator_32, interview, cases 4 & 7)
Challenges of obtaining valid data
Memory lapse "We had problems with the forms because some elderly people we found couldn't remember what disease they went there for, and
others had visited the healthcare center more than four times with four different illnesses during the trimester, so which illness will you
take?” (Investigator_46, interview, across cases)
Misunderstanding of services provided “If we take postnatal consultations, for instance (…) She'll say, ‘I was there, but it was for a delivery.’ That's how she views it, because
the postnatal consultation is seven days after delivery.” (Verifier_28, interview, across cases)
Fear or apprehension of investigator or
of retaliation from healthcare
workers
“Sometimes, patients say no just so the investigator will leave.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
Social desirability bias “The healthcare centers got excellent scores, but we know, based on experience, without studies, that people are complaining (…). If we
ask them how they're doing, they'll say there's no problem.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
Desire to protect secrecy “Sometimes women consult without their husbands knowing.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
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there are villages where everyone cheats.” (Manager cited in field
notes, across cases)
3.9. Staged supervisions
Community verifiers are responsible for conducting supervi-
sions of the verification process to assess whether it follows the
recommended procedures. However, observation showed some
community verifiers were very close to the investigators from the
local association. Some had developed friendships and called each
other “relatives” (because they shared the same last name) and
spent a lot of leisure time together. During one such social outing, a
community verifier staged the next day's supervisions with two
investigators in charge of finding patients in different catchment
areas. He revealed exactly when and where the supervisions were
going to occur.
3.10. Inconclusive process for identifying fictitious services or
providing feedback to healthcare workers
One of the main purposes of community verification is to
“ensure the veracity of the reported healthcare services by identi-
fying fictitious users and fictitious services” (ST-FBR, 2016). Ac-
cording to the intervention model, community verification results
can lead to sanctions for healthcare centers if fraud is detected
(Ministere de la sante, 2013). When the data were collected, how-
ever, the community verification results had not been used to
identify cases of fraud and to take appropriate sanctions. The
community verification results had not been presented tohealthcare workers to enable them to improve their practice. In
fact, stakeholders at the district and national level found it quite
difficult to interpret the data and conclude that healthcare workers
had voluntarily falsified medical records. There was a lack of
consensus among stakeholders regarding what decisions and ac-
tions to take regarding patients whowere not found or services that
were not confirmed by patients.
“If we're going to penalize [CSPSs], we want to make sure the
process is objective.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
“We need to identify a reasonable threshold for defining cases as
fraud.” (Manager cited in field notes, across cases)
Participants argued that a missing patient or a person who de-
nied receiving services did not necessarily imply that providers had
committed fraud, given the numerous challenges encountered
during the verification. The numbers of patients reported as
missing also depended on the motivation and abilities of in-
vestigators in charge of tracing them. Due to these challenges,
participants at the national PBF meeting questioned the method-
ology adopted for the verification as well as the validity and utility
of results. Others questioned the value-for-money obtained. Man-
agers reported that both community verifications jointly cost more
than $316,839 USD (186,375,875 CFA francs) across all intervention
districts. Some argued that budgets might be better invested in
supporting district management teams.
4. Discussion
This paper presents one of the rare studies using Rogers' theory
on the diffusion of innovations to study the unintended
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beyond PBF, it sheds light on what happens when new account-
ability measures and financial incentives are introduced into
complex systems. As stipulated by the theory, we found that
members' characteristics interacted with the social system and
with the nature and use of the innovation, leading to the emer-
gence of unintended consequences over time. The innovation was
reinvented during the implementation partly due to the in-
tervention's high level of complexity and its low levels of observ-
ability and compatibility with the local context.
All the unintended consequences were undesirable, as they did
not promote proper functioning of PBF, or even of the broader
health system, for that matter. This study of unintended conse-
quences may have been biased towards undesirable consequences,
because many desirable consequences were targeted by the pro-
gram at the outset, resulting in their exclusion from this study. For
example, we did not assess the extent to which the community
verifications served as a powerful tool to dissuade healthcare pro-
viders from falsifying results or to motivate them to interact with
patients more kindly. Moreover, many of these consequences were
anticipated by program planners who, in the intervention guide-
lines, directly or indirectly addressed the risk that investigators
would falsify verification records and the importance of preserving
patient confidentiality (see Supplementary File 5) (Ministere de la
Sante, 2015; 2016). To adapt our model to the evaluation of in-
novations in healthcare organizations, we found it useful to qualify
direct consequences as those pertaining to process and indirect
consequences as those pertaining to outcomes. This provided a
meaningful distinction between consequences. From an analytical
standpoint, we found that the findings of this study can be gener-
alized to Rogers’ theoretical propositions. More than one of the
cases supported the theory, so we can claim replication (Yin, 2009).
This qualitative study is an original contribution to a field
dominated by quantitative analyses done by health economists. To
our knowledge, it is the first qualitative multiple case study to
examine the unintended consequences of community verifications,
a cornerstone of PBF. Overall, results were not really different be-
tween cases. The same set of factors shaped the implementation
process and the unintended consequences of community verifica-
tion. For patients, unintended changes included loss of confiden-
tiality, fears, and apprehensions, as well as marital issues. For actors
conducting the verification, unintended changes included work
overload, dissatisfaction regarding compensation, and falsification
of data. The results of the community verifications were difficult for
local stakeholders to interpret due to the numerous challenges
encountered during the verifications (e.g. difficult working condi-
tions, population mobility). Some actors questioned the utility and
validity of the verification results, which were not presented to
healthcare workers or used to identify cases of fraud. Some local
stakeholders were left wondering whether community verification
offered good value for money, as the costs were perceived to be
high. This highlights the importance of pursuing research on the
efficiency of this mechanism (Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2016).
Interestingly, we found that some unintended consequences
were mainly the result of poor implementation processes, while
others reflected potential weaknesses in the logic of the interven-
tion model. Efforts to improve implementation, for example, could
more easily address issues such as work overload, some dissatis-
faction regarding payment modalities, and lack of feedback to
healthcare providers. Other unintended consequences, however,
such as breaches of patient confidentiality, fears of retaliation from
healthcare workers, marital issues, and inability to identify ficti-
tious services reported by healthcare providers, may continue to
arise evenwhen the intervention is implemented perfectly because
the context may not allow for the application of the model in thefirst place. Program planners may find it more difficult to address
these unintended consequences without adapting the intervention
model to fit the context. This highlights the importance of exam-
ining how real-life contextual factors influence the implementation
and effectiveness of intervention models, as few studies have
focused on this (Belaid and Ridde, 2015; Shoveller et al., 2016).
Although Rogers' classification of desirable/undesirable conse-
quences is dichotomous, it is important to consider that undesir-
able consequences are not all equivalent in their negative impacts.
For example, some undesirable consequences, such as the falsifi-
cation of verified data or staged supervisions, may hinder the
functioning of the intervention without directly harming popula-
tion health, at least in the short term. In contrast, other undesirable
consequences, such as patients' loss of confidentiality or increased
fears, may represent a greater threat to quality of care (given the
way quality is measured within the PBF intervention) and may
discourage healthcare seeking and hence negatively affect popu-
lation health. Policy-makers involved in PBF should judge the po-
tential harm of unintended consequences in relation to context and
prioritize actions addressing those that are more likely to cause
salient levels of damage or harm. This study highlights the impor-
tance of examining each component of the complex PBF interven-
tionmodel in depth. Many components of PBF have yet to be closely
scrutinized (Renmans et al., 2016). Past PBF studies, for example,
have not sufficiently focused on: 1) healthcare workers’ coaching
by CVA agents; 2) performance improvement plans; 3) indexing
tools; 4) counter-verifications; and 5) PBF at management levels.
Unintended changes in any of these parts of the intervention can
trigger significant changes in other parts and consequently should
be given attention (Morin, 2006; Rogers, 2003). As described by the
complexity approach, we cannot know the whole without knowing
the parts (May et al., 2016; Morin, 2006).
The results are consistent with past studies of PBF in LMICs.
Many studies have shown that workloads induced by different
components of PBF are very burdensome (Antony et al., 2017; Kalk
et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2014). Past research has also highlighted
verification officers' conflicts of interest (Bertone and Meessen,
2013). For example, the fact that investigators are paid only for
patients they trace triggers a clash between their self-interest (i.e.,
maximizing their personal income) and the public interest (i.e.,
verifying healthcare workers' performance). Studies of PBF in
Rwanda and Burkina Faso found that actors sometimes filled out
forms arbitrarily and retrospectively, particularly due to lack of
time (Kalk et al., 2010). Similarly, investigators who falsified forms
in this study highlighted the unrealistic time frames allotted in
which to trace patients. Lastly, our results are consistent with
studies that found that patients’ comments regarding healthcare
services were not presented to the medical staff, despite the
amount of resources invested (Antony et al., 2017; Falisse et al.,
2012). In Benin, for example, about 0.50 USD was spent on verifi-
cations for each 1 USD paid to providers (Antony et al., 2017).
Our study does bring forward some different findings than past
literature. The study in Burundi found that community-based or-
ganizations contracted as verifiers had gotten in touch with the
medical staff, something prohibited by their contract, in only two
cases (Falisse et al., 2012). In contrast, our results suggested that
community verification data were often falsified. This divergence
may be due to the fact that our study included non-participant
observations and informal discussions, which tend to reveal more
authentic behaviors and beliefs over time (Olivier de Sardan and
Tidjani Alou, 2015). Future studies on PBF and community verifi-
cations may find it beneficial to include data-gathering techniques
inspired by anthropology.
The World Bank's PBF toolkit argues that, in well-designed PBF
programs, fewer than 5% of service users cannot be traced back in
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this data come from or what “well-designed” implies in complex
settings where implementation is unlikely to be carried out exactly
as intended. Results of the current study highlight the need to be
skeptical of high performance scores for community verifications,
as they may be falsified. Stakeholders should be wary of the po-
tential false sense of security created by an ineffective verification
mechanism in which everyone has an incentive to report positive
results.
This study does have some limitations. All the PBF investigators
observed during the verification were employed by the same local
association. It is possible that including investigators from other
local associations would have influenced the results. We do, how-
ever, believe the results may be transferable to a larger context
within Burkina Faso for two main reasons. First, the results were
replicated in different cases located in different villages, suggesting
they were not due to a particular situation. Second, most of the
unintended consequences, and their contributing factors, that
emerged during the multiple case study were also reported during
an annual PBF reviewmeeting for 2015, which covered other health
districts and over 70 local associations implementing community
verifications across the country. Another limitation of the study is
that it only captured unintended consequences that emerged in the
short-term, given the timing of our data collection vis-a-vis the
intervention. Research in countries that have more experience in
conducting community verifications may be able to confirm the
existence of these unintended consequences and provide insight
into how theymight evolve over time. For example, future research
could further explore how verifications modify trust relationships
among health workers, patients and managers over time.
5. Conclusion
Community verifications are mechanisms adopted to promote
transparency and give greater voice to the population to improve
healthcare services. This multiple case study examined the unin-
tended consequences, and their contributing factors, of community
verifications in the context of a PBF intervention. Results showed
that community verifications led to a series of undesirable unin-
tended consequences. These unintended consequences could
jeopardize the overall effectiveness of community verifications and
impede the success of PBF.
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